


stod x	Store Direct	m[x] ← ac
addd x	Add Direct	ac ← ac + m[x]
subd x	Sub. Direct	ac ← ac - m[x]
jpos x	Jump on pos.	IF ac ≥ 0 : pc ← x
jzer x	Jump on zero	IF ac = 0 : pc ← x
jump x	Jump uncond.	pc ← x (0 ≤ x ≤ 4095)
loda c	Load constant	ac ← c (0 ≤ c ≤ 4095)
lodl x	Load local	ac ← m[sp+x]
stod x	Store Direct	m[sp+x] ← ac
addl x	Add local	ac ← ac + m[sp+x]
subl x	Subtract local	ac ← ac - m[sp+x]
jneg x	Jump on negative	if ac < 0 : pc ← x
jnze x	Jump on nonzero	if ac ≠ 0 : pc ← x
call x	Call procedure	sp ← sp - 1; m[sp] ← pc; pc ← x
pshi	Push indirect	sp ← sp - 1; m[sp] ← m[ac]
popi	Pop indirect	m[ac] ← m[sp]; sp ← sp + 1
push	Push onto stack	sp ← sp - 1; m[sp] ← ac
pop	Pop off stack	ac ← m[sp]; sp ← sp + 1
retn	Return from proc.	pc ← m[sp]; sp ← sp + 1
swap	Swap ac, pc	temp ← ac; ac ← pc; pc ← temp
insp y	Increment sp	sp ← sp + y; (0 ≤ y ≤ 255)
desp y	Decrement sp	sp ← sp - y; (0 ≤ y ≤ 255)

I progetti di ricerca a Verona: Progettare le difese vs studiare gli attacchi

Dipartimento di Informatica
Università di Verona



MALWARE IN MODERN CYBERCRIME




VULNERABILITIES

SYSTEM VULNERABILITIES


HUMAN ISSUE



```
void sampleFunction() {  
    char bufferA[50];  
    char bufferB[16];  
    printf("where do you live?");  
    gets(bufferA);  
    strcpy(bufferB,bufferA);  
    return;  
}  
main() {  
    printf("Hello World!");  
    sampleFunction();  
    printf("All done!");  
}
```



SECURITY SCENARIOS



Threats Analysis

FACE: Formal Avenue for Chasing malwarE

METAMORPHISM (static analysis)

Original code	Obfuscated code
E8 00000000 call 0h	E8 00000000 call 0h
5B pop ebx	5B pop ebx
8D 4B 42 lea ecx, [ebx + 42h]	8D 4B 42 lea ecx, [ebx + 45h]
51 push ecx	90 nop
50 push eax	51 push ecx
50 push eax	50 push eax
0F01 4C 24 FE stdt [esp - 02h]	50 push eax
5B pop ebx	90 nop
83 C3 1C add ebx, 1Ch	0F01 4C 24 FE stdt [esp - 02h]
FA cli	5B pop ebx
8B 2B mov ebp, [ebx]	83 C3 1C add ebx, 1Ch
	90 nop
	FA cli
	8B 2B mov ebp, [ebx]

Signature	New signature
E800 0000 005B 8D4B 4251 5050	E800 0000 005B 8D4B 4290 5150
0F01 4C24 FE5B 83C3 1CFA 8B2B	5090 0F01 4C24 FE5B 83C3 1C90
	FA8B 2B

[SYMANTEC 2013]

2011 variants per malware rate **5:1**

2012 variants per malware rate **38:1**

**CODE SHAPE
MUTATION**

MALWARE-ENVIRONMENT INTERPLAY (dynamic analysis)



DORMANT BEHAVIOUR

0101
1000 1011
0101 0011

0101 1101
1000 1011
1100 1111
0101 0011

1101
1100 1111

ANTI-EMULATION

METAMORPHISM



Self-modifying malware contains the metamorphic engine


EXTRACT METAMORPHIC ENGINE BY
STATICALLY ANALYSING THE METAMORPHIC CODE
HARD

Phase semantics [2010 VR] precisely models code changes, but leads to an undecidable detection scheme

CODE SHAPE
MUTATION

Lose precision to gain decidability

$\forall P : flow(P) = flow(M) \Rightarrow P$ is variant of M



METAPHOR SIGNATURE

Merge of the flow graphs (of system calls) after 100 mutations




Validation of the model on mobile malware

MALWARE-ENVIRONMENT INTERPLAY


Study **program interaction**: how the execution of a program interferes with the execution of another program

Abstract Non-Interference (ANI) theory [2004 VR] on data

Lift ANI theory on programs
HARD



ANTI-EMULATION



DORMANT BEHAVIOUR

Validation of the model on mobile malware




IA and MALWARE ANALYSIS


- Analisi attiva del malware attraverso un gioco
- Valutazione empirica della metodologia

21.19. malware.exe	248	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes	SUCCESS	Desired Access: M...
21.19. malware.exe	248	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes	SUCCESS	Query Name
21.19. malware.exe	248	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{73364099-1240-4d81-b11a-67e448373048}	NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: M...
21.19. malware.exe	248	RegOpenKey	HKCR	SUCCESS	Desired Access: M...
21.19. malware.exe	248	RegOpenKey	HKCR\CLSID\{73364099-1240-4d81-b11a-67e448373048}	NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: W...
21.19. malware.exe	248	RegOpenKey	HKCR\CLSID	SUCCESS	Desired Access: M...
21.19. malware.exe	248	RegOpenKey	HKCR\CLSID\{73364099-1240-4d81-b11a-67e448373048}	SUCCESS	Desired Access: M...
21.19. malware.exe	248	SetEndOfFileInfo...	C:\WINDOWS\system32\config\software.LDG	SUCCESS	EndOfFile: 36,884
21.19. malware.exe	248	SetEndOfFileInfo...	C:\WINDOWS\system32\config\software.LDG	SUCCESS	EndOfFile: 40,980
21.19. malware.exe	248	SetEndOfFileInfo...	C:\WINDOWS\system32\config\software.LDG	SUCCESS	EndOfFile: 53,248
21.19. malware.exe	248	RegOpenKey	HKCR\CLSID	SUCCESS	SUCCESS
21.19. malware.exe	248	RegOpenKey	HKCR\CLSID\{73364099-1240-4d81-b11a-67e448373048}	SUCCESS	Desired Access: W...
21.19. malware.exe	248	RegOpenKey	HKCR\CLSID\{73364099-1240-4d81-b11a-67e448373048}	SUCCESS	SUCCESS
21.19. malware.exe	248	RegOpenKey	HKCR	SUCCESS	Query Name
21.19. malware.exe	248	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes	SUCCESS	Desired Access: W...
21.19. malware.exe	248	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{73364099-1240-4d81-b11a-67e448373048}	NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: W...
21.19. malware.exe	248	RegOpenKey	HKCR\CLSID\{73364099-1240-4d81-b11a-67e448373048}	SUCCESS	Desired Access: W...
21.19. malware.exe	248	RegOpenKey	HKCR\CLSID\{73364099-1240-4d81-b11a-67e448373048}	SUCCESS	Query Name
21.19. malware.exe	248	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{73364099-1240-4d81-b11a-67e448373048}	NAME NOT FOUND	Desired Access: M...
21.19. malware.exe	248	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{73364099-1240-4d81-b11a-67e448373048}	SUCCESS	Desired Access: M...
21.19. malware.exe	248	RegOpenKey	HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{73364099-1240-4d81-b11a-67e448373048}	SUCCESS	Query Name


Log di esecuzione



Creazione Modello




Valutazione Sperimentale




Scelta honey

IA and MALWARE ANALYSIS

- Strumenti sviluppati:
 - ambiente per analisi empirica
 - algoritmi di analisi
- Problemi aperti:
 - Generazione automatica del modello
 - Raffinamento delle tecniche di analisi



Ambiente sperimentale



Metodologia analisi

DefiAnCE

A proactive Defence against Cyber Crime




- **Goal 3: Data/program interference (Computer forensics)**

AbScript

Static analyzer for dynamic languages (eg. PHP)
based on abstract interpretation

Need to model and analyze the evolution of the code



Static analyzer which handles
dynamic code mutations

TECHNICAL RISKS



Alan Turing



Kurt Godel

ANALYSIS
PRECISE vs COMPLEXITY vs COVERAGE

HIGH
COMPLEXITY
HARD

**DYNAMIC
PARTIAL**

RECOVERY


SPY

**STATIC
EXHAUSTIVE**


LOW
COMPLEXITY

PRECISE

LOOSE




DESIGN and MEASURE CODE PROTECTION




Abstract Interpretation is a general theory for approximating the semantics of dynamic systems (Cousot & Cousot 1977)

DESIGN and MEASURE CODE PROTECTION

P



- Each tool is an Abstract Interpretation




We can quantify the security achieved by looking at proof complexity

DESIGN and MEASURE CODE PROTECTION


$\odot(P)$

Constrained Adversary




- Transform code to make *all* tools blind

$$\begin{aligned}
 A \vee B &= \neg(\neg A \wedge \neg B) \\
 A \Rightarrow B &= \neg A \vee B \\
 &= \neg(A \wedge \neg B) \\
 A \oplus B &= (A \wedge \neg B) \vee (\neg A \wedge B) \\
 &= \neg[\neg(A \wedge \neg B) \wedge \neg(\neg A \wedge B)] \\
 A \equiv B &= (A \wedge B) \vee (\neg A \wedge \neg B) \\
 &= \neg[\neg(A \wedge B) \wedge \neg(\neg A \wedge \neg B)]
 \end{aligned}$$



Removing noise means refining abstractions/complicating proofs
(Giacobazzi et al. 2000/2012)

DESIGN and MEASURE CODE PROTECTION




- Force the attacker to use **automated tools** (programs of large size and highly interconnected)
- Design **code transformations** making tools blind
- Determine **lower bounds** for proof complexity in obfuscated code
- **Measure** the degree of noise/slowdown induced in obfuscation

By constraining the adversary within a theorem prover we can quantify the security achieved from obfuscation

PROJECTS

- FIRB-2013 (Coordinatore: Mila Dalla Preda)
FACE: Formal Avenue for Chasing malwarE (marzo 2014 - febbraio 2017)
- SIR 2014 (Coordinatore: Isabella Mastroeni)
DefiAnCE: proactive DEFence against Cyber crimE (in fase di valutazione da parte del Ministero)
- Joint Project (Coordinatore: Isabella Mastroeni)
AbScript: Abstract Interpretation based Analysis of Scripting Languages
(settembre 2014 - agosto 2016)
- Joint Project (Coordinatore: Roberto Giacobazzi)
Interpretation-based design and measurement of code-protecting transformations
(settembre 2014 - agosto 2016)

PEOPLE



Roberto Giacobazzi

Abstract Interpretation, Malware analysis, non-interference, static analyzer PHP



Fausto Spoto

Abstract Interpretation, static analyzer PHP



Isabella Mastroeni

Abstract Interpretation, Malware analysis, non-interference, static analyzer PHP, game theory and AI



Alessandro Farinelli

game theory and AI



Mila Dalla Preda

Abstract Interpretation, Malware analysis, non-interference, static analyzer PHP