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Modeling metamorphism by abstract interpretation

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The problem

Malware analysis: signature checking

- Malware refers to malicious software
- Signature checking: identify a sequence of instructions which is unique to a malware (virus signature) then scan program for signatures
- * Example: *Chernobyl* signature:

E800 0000 005B 8D4B 4251 5050 0F01 4C24 FE5B 83C3 1CFA 882B

Cumbersome, inaccurate, easy to foil....

Anti-anti malware

- * How can we escape signature checking?
 - * ...by dynamically modifying malware structure!
- Polymorphic malware contain decryption routines which decrypt encrypted constant parts of their body.
- Metamorphic malware typically do not use encryption, but mutates (obfuscate) forms in subsequent generations.



Metamorphism as obfuscation

From Chern	obyl CIH 1.4	Loop:	pop	ecx	
Loop: po jo mo	pop ecx jecxz SFModMark mov esi, ecx mov eax, Od601h pop edx pop ecx call edi jmp Loop	N1:	jecxz xor beqz mov nop	z SFMc ebx, N1 esi,	odMark ebx ecx
po po ca ji			mov pop pop nop call	eax, edx ecx edi	0d601h
		N2:	xor beqz jmp	ebx, N2 Loop	ebx

Metamorphism as obfuscation

		Loop:	
			pop ecx
From Chernobyl CIH 1.4			nop
			call edi
Loop:			xor ebx, ebx
	pop ecx		beqz N2
	jecxz SFModMark	N2:	jmp Loop
	mov esi, ecx		
	mov eax, 0d601h		nop
	pop edx		mov eax, 0d601h
	pop ecx		pop edx
	call edi		pop ecx
	jmp Loop		nop
			jecxz SFModMark
			xor ebx, ebx
			beqz N1
		N1:	mov esi, ecx

Metamorphism as obfuscation

	Loop:	
		pop ecx
		nop
		jmp L1
From Chernobyl CIH 1.4	L3:	call edi
		xor ebx, ebx
		beqz N2
Loop:	N2:	jmp Loop
pop ecx		jmp L4
jecxz SFModMark	L2:	nop
mov esi, ecx		mov eax, 0d601h
mov eax, 0d601h		pop edx
pop edx		pop ecx
pop ecx		nop
call edi		jmp L3
jmp Loop	L1:	jecxz SFModMark
		xor ebx, ebx
		beqz N1
	N1:	mov esi, ecx
		jmp L2
	L4:	

Metamorphism: an example

Malware evolution push ecx push ecx mov ecx, [ebp + 10]mov ecx, ebp mov ecx, ebp push eax push eax mov eax, 33 add eax, 2342 push ecx mov eax, 33 add ecx, eax mov ecx,ebp add ecx, eax push ecx add ecx,33 pop eax mov ecx,ebp push esi pop eax mov [ebp - 3], eax add ecx,33 push esi mov eax, esi mov esi,ecx mov [ecx-36],eax mov esi, ecx push eax sub esi,34 push edx mov esi, ecx mov [esi-2],eax pop ecx push edx pop esi mov edx, 34 xor edx, 778f pop ecx sub esi, edx mov edx, 34 pop edx sub esi, edx mov [esi - 2], eax pop edx mov [esi-2], eax pop esi pop esi pop ecx pop ecx

* How can we model and compute signatures for metamorphism?

Metamorphism: some (public) history

Win32.Evol

swaps instructions with equivalents

inserts junk code between essential instructions

Regswap (Win32)

same code different register names

BadBoy (DOS) and Ghost (Win32)

same code different subroutine order (n! possible mutations: 10 modules ~3.6M possible signatures)

Zmorph (Win95)

decrypt virus body instruction by instruction

push instructions on stack insert and remove jumps rebuild body on stack Zperm (Win95)



Attacking metamorphism

- * Idea: Behavior Monitors
- Run suspect program in an emulator and extract a DB of relevant signatures (huge DB)
- Look for changes in file structure: Some viruses modify files in a consistent way (inaccurate)
- Disassemble and look for virus-like instructions: reverse engineering malware (expensive)



- * The code may contain its own metamorphic engine ME
- * The metamorphic engine can be used when engineering malware
- Metamorphic signature: is a language *L* of possible signatures generated by a metamorphic malware:

 $\sigma \in \mathcal{L} \Rightarrow \sigma$ is a possible signature

* Is there a way for extracting a metamorphic signatures?

Related works

- Specify some abstraction (CFG, instruction equivalence, rewrite rules towards normal form - undo metamorphism)
- * [Dalla Preda et al POPL07, Filiol PWASET07, Zbitsky JCV 09, Bonfante et al JCV 09]
 - Existing semantics-based approach to malware detection are promising but they still rely on a priori knowledge of the metamorphic transformations used by malware writers
- Need to model the self-modifying behavior of a metamorphic malware without any a priori knowledge of the transformations it uses



* Idea: Extract *L* as a abstract interpretation of the metamorphic malware!

Extracting metamorphic signatures is approximating malware semantics

- data objects are code slices
- abstraction acts on code structure (code may be as complex as data!!)
- invariants on mutational code structure describe the metamorphic engine behavior!!
- fix-point abstraction approximate invariants, i.e. generates metamorphic signatures....

Modeling metamorphism

Phase semantics



* Phase semantics: partition the trace of execution states into phases,



Fix-point phase semantics



Fix-point phase semantics

- * Phase transition: $\mathcal{T}^{Ph}(P_0) = \begin{cases} P_i & s = s_0 \dots s_i \dots s_n \in \mathbf{S}[\![P_0]\!], s_i \in bound(s), \\ \forall l \in [1, i-1] : s_l \notin bound(s) \end{cases}$
 - * Fix-point iteration: $S^{Ph}[P] = Ifp\mathcal{F}_{T^{Ph}}[P]$



Correctness of phase semantics

$$\langle \wp(\Sigma^*), \subseteq \rangle \xrightarrow{\gamma_{Ph}} \langle \wp(\mathbf{P}^*), \subseteq \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha_{Ph}} \langle \wp(\mathbf{P}^*), \subseteq \rangle$$

- Trace semantics and phase semantics are related by abstraction:
 - * α_{Ph} keeps only phase bounds
- Locally incomplete.....
- * Fix-point complete: $\alpha_{Ph}(Ifp\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{T}}[\![P_0]\!]) = Ifp\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{T}^{Ph}}[\![P_0]\!]$

CONCRETE TEST FOR METAMORPHISM

 $\begin{array}{lll} \mathsf{P}_0 \rightsquigarrow_{\mathit{Ph}} Q & \Leftrightarrow & \exists \mathsf{P}_0, \mathsf{P}_1, ..., \mathsf{P}_n \in \mathbf{S}^{\mathit{Ph}}\llbracket \mathsf{P}_0 \rrbracket, \exists i \in [0, n]: \ \mathsf{P}_i = Q \\ & \text{no false positives, no false negatives} \end{array}$

Abstracting metamorphism

Abstracting phases

* Need abstraction for approximating phases!!! design GC: $\langle \wp(\mathbf{P}^*), \subseteq \rangle \xrightarrow[\alpha_A]{\gamma_A} \langle A, \sqsubseteq_A \rangle$

define the abstract transition relation $\mathcal{T}^{A} : A \to \wp(A)$

define $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{T}A} \llbracket P_0 \rrbracket : A \to A$ whose fixpoint computation $Ifp \sqsubseteq A \mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{T}A} \llbracket P_0 \rrbracket = S^A \llbracket P_0 \rrbracket$ corresponds to the abstract specification of the metamorphic behavior

prove that $\mathbf{S}^{\mathcal{A}} \llbracket P_0 \rrbracket$ is a correct approximation of phase semantics $\mathbf{S}^{Ph} \llbracket P_0 \rrbracket$, i.e., $\alpha_{\mathcal{A}} (Ifp \subseteq \mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{T}^{Ph}} \llbracket P_0 \rrbracket) \sqsubseteq_{\mathcal{A}} Ifp \sqsubseteq_{\mathcal{T}} \mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{T}} \llbracket P_0 \rrbracket$

ABSTRACT TEST FOR METAMORPHISM

 $\mathsf{P}_{0} \rightsquigarrow_{\mathcal{A}} Q \iff \alpha_{\mathcal{A}}(Q) \sqsubseteq_{\mathcal{A}} \mathbf{S}^{\mathcal{A}} \llbracket \mathsf{P}_{0} \rrbracket$

no false negatives

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Phases as FSA

$\mathring{\alpha}: \mathbf{P} \to \mathfrak{F}$

- P_0 1: MEM[f] := 100
 - 2: input \Rightarrow MEM[a]
 - 3: if $(MEM[a] \mod 2)$ goto 7
 - 4: MEM[b] := MEM[a]
 - 5: $MEM[\alpha] := MEM[\alpha]/2$
 - 6: goto 8
 - 7: MEM[a] := (MEM[a] + 1)/2

- 8: MEM[MEM[f]] := MEM[4]
- 9: MEM[MEM[f] + 1] := MEM[5]
- 10: MEM[MEM[f] + 2] := encode(goto 6)
- 11: MEM[4] := encode(nop)
- 12: MEM[5] := encode(goto MEM[f])

3:
$$MEM[f] := MEM[f] + 3$$

14: goto 2



Phase semantics as traces of FSA



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Phase semantics as traces of FSA: $S^{\sharp}[P_0]$

- * We need a static approximation of the Phase transfer function
 - Stack analysis: approximating the values on top of the stack
 - * Memory analysis: approximating the values stored in memory
- We emulate the run of a phase generating a superset of FSA that may be generated (over approximation!)

$$\mathbf{S}^{\mathfrak{F}}\llbracket P_0 \rrbracket \subseteq \mathbf{S}^{\sharp}\llbracket P_0 \rrbracket$$

- Regular metamorphism: mutation constrained in a regular language of instructions
- Collapsing a (static) trace of FSA into a single FSA: widening
 - * $\langle \mathfrak{F}/_{\equiv}, \sqsubseteq_{\mathfrak{F}} \rangle$ where $M_1 \sqsubseteq_{\mathfrak{F}} M_2 \Leftrightarrow L(M_1) \subseteq L(M_2)$

 $\mathbf{W}_{0} = \mathbf{\mathring{\alpha}}(\mathbf{P}_{0}) \qquad \qquad \mathbf{W}_{i+1} = \mathbf{W}_{i} \nabla \mathcal{F}_{\tau \sharp}^{\underline{U}} \llbracket \mathbf{P}_{0} \rrbracket (\mathbf{W}_{i})$

ABSTRACT TEST FOR METAMORPHISM on $\mathfrak{F}/_{\equiv}$ $P_0 \rightsquigarrow_{\mathfrak{F}} Q \Leftrightarrow \ lpha(Q) \sqsubseteq_{\mathfrak{F}} W\llbracket P_0 \rrbracket$ no false negatives

- * Let M₁ and M₂ be two FSA
- * $R_n \subseteq Q_1 \times Q_2$ is a state relation

 $(q_1, q_2) \in R_n$ if q_1 and q_2 recognize the same language of strings of length n

$$q \equiv_R q'$$
 iff $\exists r \in Q_1 : (r,q) \in R_n$ and $(r,q') \in R_n$
 $M_1 \bigtriangledown M_2 = M_2 / \equiv_R$

* It is a widening if on finite alphabet: approximate instruction terms!





MEM[f]:=100;input=>MEM[a];MEM[a] mod 2 = 0; MEM[b]:=MEM[a]; goto; MEM[b]:=MEM[a]; goto;...



MEM[f]:=100;input=>MEM[a];MEM[a] mod 2 = 0; MEM[b]:=MEM[a]; goto; MEM[b]:=MEM[a]; goto;...



MEM[f]:=100;input=>MEM[a];MEM[a] mod 2 = 0; MEM[b]:=MEM[a]; goto; MEM[b]:=MEM[a]; goto;...

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MEM[f]:=100;input=>MEM[a];MEM[a] mod 2 = 0; MEM[b]:=MEM[a]; goto; MEM[b]:=MEM[a]; goto;...

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Example: code permutation + substitution



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Conclusions

What we have done!

- What we have:
 - * A formal model of metamorphic code by Phase semantics
 - * A method for approximating the Phase semantics
 - A computable approximation of regular metamorphism
- The approach:
 - requires no a priori knowledge about the metamorphic engine
 - * is parametric on several abstractions (instructions, phases, metamorphism...)
 - is likely for refinement (grammars, constraints etc...)
 - * suitable for semi-automatic malware analysis: *generation-test-refine*

What is missing?

- * An adequate experimental evaluation (beyond toy examples....)
 - Pro: most malware implement relatively simple metamorphic engines (mostly regular) to foil syntactic signature checking
 - Con: hacking can easily foil any abstraction
- * A practical solution: behavioral monitoring + FSA abstraction + widening
- * More advanced abstractions: e.g., *context free metamorphism & grammar widening*
- * The paper is a preliminary approach to a truly hard problem!
 - Next steps: experimental evaluation of regular metamorphism analysis, approximate behavioral monitoring.

Thanks!