


Program Transformation, Semantic Modelling and AI A Personal Perspective

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15YNAAI



The Imperial Chapter


Program Transformation is cool, I think I'll try and do a PhD...

Imperial AI (Hankin, Burn, Abramsky)

- Interesting AI (strictness)
- The EU BRA “Semantique”


The DIKU Chapter

- Time to focus on interesting transformations (UF, deforestation,...).
- Decided to look more at **Partial Evaluation**




How to Prove Correctness of PT

- Monolithic approach
 - “The analysis is correct if the transformation works!” [Mitch Wand]
- Model-based Approach




How to Prove Correctness of PT

- Monolithic approach
 - Modularity: independent variation of components
 - “The analysis is correct if the transformation works!” [Mitch Wand]
 - All arguments: construction, combination
- Model-based Approach



Off-line Partial Evaluation



- Some elegant models of binding times
 - Domain projections [Launchbury,89]
 - PERS [Hunt90,HS91]
- Missing Link between models and PE

The missing link

- ...Is broken! The model was not correct
 - semantically sound binding times could make the PE go wrong!


The missing link

- A new model

“A Semantic Model of Binding Times for Safe Partial Evaluation” [Henglein&Sands '95]

- Technical highlights:

- Dealing with program annotations without “sticky” semantics
- A “type” system parameterised by an AI



The Chalmers Chapter

- Haskell compilers packed with program transformations enabled by static analyses
- An example
 - Inlining: $\text{let } x = M \text{ in } N \rightarrow N[x:=M]$
 - trivially “correct” - but only used when it is believed to be beneficial...

Work-Space Safety of Inlining

- Correctness = work & space **safety** wrt a space and time semantics
- Analysis: usage analysis
 - “this binding will be used at most once”
- Many instances but nothing even close to a safety proof for inlining
 - hint at why it is hard: $x + y \rightarrow y + x \dots$

The missing link...

...is partly broken

- Semantic guarantees provided by several systems **need to be strengthened** to guarantee space-safe inlining
- Some usage analyses are **unsafe** for inlining
 - the analysis can't be smarter than the GC when it comes to the meaning of “live”

[A Foundation for Space-safe transformations of call-by-need, Gustavsson& Sands '99]

Lesson learned

For program transformation, semantic modelling is great, but

we need the *right* models!

Challenge

- Top down design starting with the **intended transformation** rather than what we *hope* is the right semantic property
- Can we constructively build analyses from the transformations rather than the concrete-abstract domains?

Further Challenges

- Security/safety increasingly important
- The role of AI and Security analysis
 - e.g. Giacobazzi & Mastroeni: AI as a generalized noninterference framework;
Hunt & Sands: used AI to understand flow-sensitive security type systems
- Security models get complex
 - but often there is no formal way to validate the correctness of the models

Conclusion

“Ideas are spread by people not papers”
- PC

Thanks to

- the AI community (in particular ESPRIT BRA “Semantique” 1989-2002)
- Coauthors Seb Hunt, Fritz Henglein, Jörgen Gustavsson, Andrei Sabelfeld